DRISCOLLFINALIZED_SIX

1/5/2011 10:29 PM

Comments
MICROCREDIT: NOT YET A PANACEA TO END
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN
Katherine Driscoll*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery.1 Similar to
traditional slaveholders, traffickers retain complete control over the
enslaved, who must live and work as commanded by the trafficker.2
Estimates vary widely on the number of trafficking victims, but the range is
between one and twenty-seven million people.3 Eighty percent of these
victims are women.4
Although there are a number of factors that “push” women from
countries of origin and “pull” them into destination countries, the greatest
underlying cause of trafficking in women is poverty.5
In many cases, traffickers promise a better economic future and
deceive women into accepting a fraudulent offer of employment abroad.6
Once travel is underway, the trafficking situation begins. The trafficked
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, May 2010. A.B. Political
Science, 2008, Bryn Mawr College. Special thanks to the members of the University of
Pennsylvania‟s Journal of Business Law for their helpful editing and comments. I would
also like to thank my family for their love and encouragement and Natalie for her constant
support throughout this process.
1. See KATHRYN CULLEN-DUPONT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING 7 (2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 4.
4. See Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel:
Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 342 (2007) (highlighting human trafficking as a
crime that disproportionately affects women).
5. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 23.
6. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 25; see also ALEXIS A. ARONOWITZ, HUMAN
TRAFFICKING, HUMAN MISERY: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN HUMAN BEINGS 55 (2009)
(“Recruitment very often involves promises of marriage (or of employment, education
opportunities, or a better life).”).
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woman‟s passport is taken and her wages are withheld until the debt that is
incurred to travel to the destination country is repaid.7 This is an almost
insurmountable task.8 Those who try to escape are severely beaten, raped,
and even killed.9
Microcredit has been lauded as a panacea to end poverty among
women.10 This Comment argues that a successful microcredit program
would substantially decrease the number of trafficked women. By reducing
poverty, women would be less compelled to seek economic opportunities
elsewhere, and thus much less likely to fall prey to trafficking. However,
this Comment also maintains that the current microcredit system actually
perpetuates poverty and increases the likelihood of women being
trafficked.
In order for microcredit to be truly successful in maximizing outreach
to the impoverished and assisting the women most vulnerable to
trafficking, it is essential that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) provide
credit to the poorest women, allow flexibility in loan repayment, educate
women about business and savings, address cultural and gender issues that
challenge women in these patriarchal societies, and collaborate with local
governments to ensure that aid reaches the poorest segment of the
population and that corruption among government officials is eliminated.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Section II discusses human
trafficking, focusing on the major underlying cause of trafficking in
women, poverty; Section III examines what microcredit is and why it has
been touted as a solution to eliminating poverty among women; Section IV
highlights the limitations of microcredit that perpetuate cycles of poverty
and increase women‟s vulnerability to trafficking; Section V discusses
recommendations for how to improve the system by expanding access to
credit, increasing flexibility in loan repayment, providing non-financial
services, and maintaining an ethos of social outreach, rather than a focus on
financial returns.
II.

TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN: A GLOBAL EPIDEMIC

The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children defines human
trafficking as follows:
7. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 57.
8. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 11 (citing McGill Int‟l Law Soc‟y,
Conference on Human Trafficking in Canada (Mar. 20, 2006)), summarized at
http://mils.mcgill.ca/resources/Human_Trafficking.pdf (detailing how a trafficked woman‟s
debt can almost never be repaid because she is required to pay for her own living expenses).
9. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 58-59.
10. TAZUL ISLAM, MICROCREDIT AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION 2-3 (2007).
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the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery
or
practices
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.11
This definition highlights the fact that trafficking is an epidemic that
largely affects women and children and often involves sexual exploitation.
It also illustrates that trafficking includes forced labor and the removal of
organs as forms of exploitation.12
Estimates vary widely on the magnitude of trafficking. According to
the U.S. Department of State, approximately 800,000 people are trafficked
across national borders each year, and millions more are trafficked within
their own country‟s borders.13 The International Labor Organization (ILO)
estimates that more than twelve million people are engaged in forced labor,
including sexual exploitation, as a result of trafficking.14 Others, including
NGOs such as Free the Slaves (FTS), approximate that there are twentyseven million victims of trafficking.15 It is estimated that more than 80% of
trafficking victims are women.16 70% of female victims are trafficked into
the commercial sex industry.17
The U.S. Department of State notes that the nationalities of women
that are trafficked are, “as diverse as the world‟s cultures.”18 One-hundred
sixty-one countries are involved in human trafficking either as source,
transit, and/or destination countries.19 Human trafficking affects every
11. G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, Art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
12. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 9.
13. See U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/ (discussing the rates of human trafficking
internationally).
14. See U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8 (2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/ (stating that at least 12.3 million adults and
children are engaged in forced labor and commercial sexual servitude).
15. See, e.g., What‟s the Story: Modern Slavery, FREE THE SLAVES,
http://wwww.freetheslaves.net/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=375&srcid=183
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2010) (reporting 27 million victims of human trafficking).
16. See Haynes, supra note 4, at 342 (illustrating how human trafficking
disproportionately affects women).
17. U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 10 (2004).
18. U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, supra note 13, at 8.
19. See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC), Trafficking in Persons: Global
Patterns 17 (April 2006) (displaying a map reporting incidences of human trafficking).
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continent and every type of economy.20 However, the origin countries with
a “very high” rate of human trafficking are Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria,
China, Lithuania, Moldova, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Thailand, and
Ukraine.21 These countries have high unemployment, poverty, civil unrest,
and unstable political regimes that have left many women destitute and, as
a result, high-risk targets for trafficking.22
Human trafficking is the third largest international criminal enterprise,
behind only drugs and weapons smuggling.23 The United Nations estimates
that the total market value of illicit human trafficking is $32 billion.24
Approximately $10 billion is derived from the initial “sale” of the
individual, and the rest represents the estimated profits from the activities
or goods produced by the victims.25
A.

The “typical” trafficking situation

The women who are most vulnerable to trafficking are largely from
poor, rural countries.26 Traffickers send recruiters to villages and towns to
lure financially insolvent women into accepting seemingly legitimate
employment, modeling, or matchmaking opportunities abroad.27 The
Internet is an effective tool for attracting women to foreign cities with false
promises of employment and a better life, exacerbating this global
epidemic.28
20. Id.
21. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the countries of origin of
human trafficking).
22. See generally id. at 23-24 (citing poverty and gender inequality as common “push
factors” evident in the countries in which trafficking originates).
23. Hanh Diep, We Pay -- The Economic Manipulation of International and Domestic
Laws to Sustain Sex Trafficking, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT‟L L. REV. 309, 317 (2005).
24. UN and Partners Launching Initiative to End „Modern Slavery‟ of Human
Trafficking,
UN
NEWS
CENTRE,
Mar.
26,
2007,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=22009&Cr=slave&Cr1=&Kw1=Initiative
&Kw2=&Kw3=.
25. Id.
26. NOELEEN HEYZER, UNIFEM, COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN:
A GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 5 (2002), available at
http://www.childtrafficking.org/pdf/user/unifem_gender_and_human_rights_framework.pdf
.
27. See AMY O‟NEILL RICHARD, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF
SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME 5 (2000), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/centerfor-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/trafficking.pdf
(focusing on how women are duped into a trafficking situation by recruiters who set up
seemingly legitimate employment opportunities that turn into trafficking situations).
28. See DONNA HUGHES, PIMPS AND PREDATORS ON THE INTERNET, GLOBALIZING THE
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN passim (1999), available at
http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/pprep.pdf (showing how the Internet has exacerbated
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In most cases, recruiters front the money to pay for travel documents
and transportation for these seemingly legitimate employment
opportunities.29 However, once travel begins, the trafficking arrangement
is initiated. The victim‟s passport is taken and she is “immediately in the
control of the trafficker.”30 During the transit, the trafficker continues to
assert control over the victim through either violence or a “subtle process
of degradation and subjugation.”31
Upon reaching the destination country, the victim‟s wages are
withheld until the debt that was incurred to travel to the destination country
is repaid.32 Paying off one‟s debt bondage is almost an impossible task. It
is estimated that a prostituted woman would have to service between 500
and 700 men just to pay her travel debt.33 According to the U.S.
Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report, “the [total] debt can
never be repaid because the costs for food, rent, medicines and condoms
are added every day.”34
In addition to debt bondage, women are prevented from escaping by
security guards, and are subjected to physical, mental, and sexual abuse.35
Women who try to escape or cooperate with police are often met with
severe violence.36 Studies have found that between one-quarter and onehalf of trafficked women seeking assistance from organizations that assist
migrants have been severely beaten and raped by their traffickers.37
B.

Poverty is the major cause of trafficking in women
The causes of trafficking in women largely stem from poverty. 38 The

the problem of trafficking of women).
29. O‟NEILL RICHARD, supra note 27, at 5.
30. KEVIN BALES, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SLAVERY 145 (2005).
31. Id.
32. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 57 (discussing how the victim of a trafficking
situation has to repay their debt to travel to the destination country).
33. CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 11 (citing McGill Int‟l Law Soc‟y, Conference
on Human Trafficking in Canada (Mar. 20, 2006), summarized at
http://mils.mcgill.ca/resources/Human_Trafficking.pdf).
34. U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 26 (2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/.
35. O‟NEILL RICHARD, supra note 27, at 5.
36. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 58 (citing JANICE C. RAYMOND & DONNA M. HUGHES,
COAL. AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, SEX TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES (2001)), available at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/sex_traff_us.pdf
(documenting the pervasiveness of violence in sex trafficking).
37. Id.
38. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the underlying causes of
trafficking, citing poverty as the main cause); see also SHELDON ZHANG, SMUGGLING AND
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: ALL ROADS LEAD TO AMERICA 9 (2007) (“Poverty is
probably the most cited factor in explaining transnational migration.”).
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majority of the world‟s poor are women. Of the 1.3 billion people in
poverty, 70% are women.39 Women perform two-thirds of the world‟s
work, but only earn 10% of the income and own 1% of the property.40
Furthermore, as developing economies globalize, many women are
being displaced from the workforce.41 When the formerly communist
countries of Eastern Europe and Russia shifted to a market economy,
women‟s employment fell by as much as 40%.42 Women looked for other
work and became easy targets for traffickers.43 As a result, two-thirds of
the 500,000 victims of the sex trade in the European Union are from the
Eastern European countries.44
Moreover, most poor women are uneducated, which means that they
have limited access to the labor market and are the first to lose their jobs in
an economic downturn. The United Nations Children‟s Fund (UNICEF)
estimates that in 2008 over 100 million children of primary school age
were out of school and 52% of them were girls.45 Rural girls face even
more barriers to receiving an education due to traditional gender norms that
discourage girls from attending school.46 Because women have high
illiteracy rates and therefore fewer skills, “the cycle of poverty is
perpetuated.”47 Women who try to wrestle free from this cycle by seeking
economic opportunities elsewhere have a high risk of being trafficked.48
Additionally, in many developing countries, discriminatory laws and
practices that tie women‟s legal, economic, and property rights to men
exacerbate the problem of women‟s poverty.49 For example, in some
cultures, new widows must follow strict mourning practices, including a
39. Sylvia Chant, The „Feminisation of Poverty‟ and the „Feminisation‟ of Anti-Poverty
Programmes: Room for Revision?, 44 J. OF DEV. STUD. 165, 166-67 (2008).
40. Gender
Equality,
UNICEF,
available
at
http://www.unicef.org/gender/index_bigpicture.html (last updated Aug. 25, 2004).
41. See Nilanjana Ray, Looking at Trafficking Through a New Lens, 12 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 909, 925-26 (2005-06) (discussing the impact that the shift from an agricultural
society to a market economy has increased the rates of unemployment and poverty among
women).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Diane Fahey, Can Tax Policy Stop Human Trafficking, 40 GEO. J. INT‟L L. 345, 352
(2009).
45. UNICEF,
PROGRESS
FOR
CHILDREN
18
(2010),
available
at
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Progress_for_Children-No.9_EN_081710.pdf.
46. Fahey, supra note 44, at 353; see also UNICEF, supra note 45, at 18 (“86% of
urban children attend primary school, compared to only 72% of rural children.”).
47. Id. at 354.
48. Id.
49. See Democracy and Global Affairs, Gender Imbalance in Human Trafficking, U.S.
DEP‟T OF STATE (June 15, 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126792.pdf
(noting that vulnerabilities to trafficking result from economic, political, and developmental
processes that can leave women dependent on men).
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month of isolation.50 During this time of isolation, inheritance laws allow
the relatives of a deceased man to confiscate the man‟s property from the
widow and her children.51 In many cases, the widow may not withdraw
money from her bank account or take a job during this time.52 When the
woman is left in extreme poverty with children to take care of, she is
willing to accept almost any economic opportunity, increasing the chances
that she will become a victim of trafficking.53
Finally, women living in poverty are often made more vulnerable to
trafficking by their own country‟s local government.54 Some governments
have refused to fight trafficking or have even encouraged it because the
local community can profit economically from the trafficking.55
Traffickers spend money in the community where they hold their victims,
injecting capital into local businesses and infusing the local economy.56
For example, a United Nations study examining the trafficking of Filipinos
to Malaysia found that senior police officers that cooperated with the
traffickers were given financial incentives and free access to the sexual
services of the trafficked women.57 Corruption is an important component
of trafficking operations and continues to exacerbate the trafficking
epidemic.
III. WHAT IS MICROCREDIT AND HOW CAN IT ALLEVIATE POVERTY AND
DETER TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN?
Microcredit has been recognized as a “financial instrument and a tool
of poverty reduction.”58 If microcredit can succeed in providing poor
50. See id. (discussing the disproportionate numbers of females forced into the sex
trade, as opposed to males).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See CULLEN-DUPONT, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing how inheritance laws limit a
widow‟s opportunities to survive economically and increase the chance that she will be
desperate to take on any employment opportunity available such as entering into a
trafficking situation).
54. See Fahey, supra note 44, at 347 (citing government corruption as the lead cause in
human trafficking).
55. Id. at 354.
56. See Kevin Bales, International Labor Standards: Quality of Information and
Measures of Progress in Combating Forced Labor, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 330
(2003) (explaining that government corruption is a significant factor contributing to the high
rates of trafficking in women).
57. ARONOWITZ, supra note 6, at 62 (citing Wong and Saat, Coalition Against
Trafficking in Human Beings in the Philippines: Country Report on Malaysia/Sabah,
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Bangi (2002) (unpublished report submitted to the United
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute)).
58. Sana Khan, Poverty Reduction Efforts: Does Microcredit Help? SAIS REV. INT‟L
AFF 147 (Summer-Fall 2009).
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women with enough financial stability that they are not burdened to seek a
better life elsewhere, it would be instrumental in decreasing rates of
trafficking in women. However, it is argued in this Comment that the
current microcredit system perpetuates poverty and increases women‟s
susceptibility to trafficking.
Before discussing the limitations of
microcredit, providing a historical overview of the development of
microcredit will be helpful to gain a more complete picture of what
microcredit is and what it does (and does not do) for alleviating poverty
and instances of trafficking in women.
A.

What is microcredit?

Microcredit is defined as the extension of small, short-term loans to
the very poor who lack the traditional physical collateral that large
institutional lenders typically require.59 The United Nations Capital
Development Fund (UNCDF) states that its goal in extending microcredit
is “to create income and employment in poor communities through
development of local microenterprises and, in the process, increase the
financial well-being of borrowers, their families, and the community at
large.”60
Typical microcredit activities include food production and sale,
handicraft production, repair services, and making clothes.61 Instead of
relying on local moneylenders who often charge between 100 to 200%
interest on loans,62 poor rural families can use microcredit to meet capital
expenditures, including the purchasing of bullocks, carts, agricultural tools,
and other equipment necessary to operate their businesses.63
B.

The history of microcredit
Professor Muhammad Yunus is often cited as the pioneer of

59. See Documents and Reports, So, What is "Microcredit"??, GLOBAL DEV. RES.
CENTER, http://www.gdrc.org/icm/what-is-ms.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2009) (discussing
the basic structure and function of microcredit).
60. U.N. CAPITAL DEV. FUND (UNCDF), MICROSTART: A GUIDE FOR PLANNING,
STARTING AND MANAGING A MICROFINANCE PROGRAMME 4-10 (1997), available at
http://www.uncdf.org/english/microfinance/uploads/thematic/MicroStartGuide-1997.pdf.
61. See UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN‟S FUND (UNICEF), GIVE US CREDIT 6, (1997),
available at http://www.unicef.org/credit/credit.pdf (discussing the typical types of business
that microloans fund).
62. Aminur Rahman, Rhetoric and Realities of Micro-Credit for Women in Rural
Bangladesh: A Village Study of Grameen Bank Lending (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Manitoba) (1998) at 172.
63. See Jamil Chowdhury, Reintegration of Internally Displaced People (IDPS): The
Need for Micro-Credit, 19 REFUGEE SURV. Q., No. 2, 2000 at 201 (stating that the
microloans are often used to purchase equipment to operate their business).
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microcredit.64 Yunus started the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1976
with a $30 loan to a group of forty-two basket weavers.65 Grameen
currently has disbursed more than $5 billion in credit to more than 5.3
million clients in more than 57,790 of Bangladesh‟s 68,000 villages.66
Women comprise 97% of Grameen's borrowers.67 Grameen reports high
loan repayment rates, averaging between 95-98%.68
The Grameen system is a group-based lending model in which
borrowers organize themselves into groups of five. The group receives one
loan and it must decide which member will receive the loan first.69 The
average loan is $388 and interest rates are approximately 20%.70 The
individual who receives the loan is responsible for loan repayments but the
group works together to make sure that all loans are repaid on time so that
the other group members will be able to receive credit in the future.71
The Grameen system requires rigorous field supervision and weekly
repayment schedules.72 The group members must meet every week to
make interest and loan payments and to review each other's business plans.
When the loan is repaid, another member is able to borrow. Although the
bank monitors the group closely, the incentive structure of the microloan
also encourages peer monitoring.73 In sum, “the physical collateral
requirement is replaced by the peer group's pressure for the borrower to
repay.”74 This social collateral has been successful in ensuring that loans
are repaid on time.75 However, as will be discussed in a later Section, these
high repayment statistics mask the immense pressure that is placed on
64. SAMIRENDRA NATH DHAR, MICRO-FINANCE FOR WOMEN, 16 (2005).
65. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 82-83 (discussing the history of the Grameen system).
66. Id.
67. Introduction,
GRAMEEN
BANK,
http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=112 (last visited Oct.
7, 2010).
68. Microfinance Basics, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/whatwe-do/microfinance/microfinance-basics (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
69. See Lisa Avery, Microcredit Extension in the Wake of Conflict: Rebuilding the
Lives and Livelihoods of Women and Children Affected by War, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 205, 221 (2005) (discussing the structure of the Grameen system).
70. Grameen Bank at a Glance, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last visited Oct.
12, 2010).
71. What is Microfinance, Why Is Microfinance Successful?, WOKAI,
http://www.wokai.org/microfinance (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
72. See Chowdhury, supra note 63, at 201 (examining the structure of the Grameen
system and the multitude of requirements that must be met to secure the loan, including
weekly meetings and repayments).
73. Alexandra Bernasek, Banking on Social Change: Grameen Bank Lending to
Women, 16 INT‟L J. POL. CULTURE, & SOC‟Y 369, 372 (2003).
74. Avery, supra note 69, at 222.
75. Bernasek, supra note 73, at 372.
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borrowers to make loan repayments. Many borrowers are pushed to take
out additional loans from local lenders at high interest rates to meet the
initial payments on the microloan.76
They also seek economic
opportunities elsewhere and, as a result, have a high risk of being lured into
seemingly legitimate employment positions that operate as a guise for
trafficking.77
C.

The development of microcredit since Grameen Bank

Since the inception of the Grameen Bank, both the United States and
the international community have responded to the “success” of the
Grameen Bank microcredit system by funding their own Microfinance
Institutions (MFIs) with the intention of decreasing poverty among women.
The United States has funded a plethora of international microcredit
programs through the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). USAID is the world's leading donor for microcredit programs,
providing over $259 million in microloans in sixty-nine countries.78
USAID reports that many of these microloans are based upon a grouplending model similar to the Grameen system and that its overall repayment
rate exceeds 95%.79
One of the largest microcredit group-lending programs funded by
USAID is the Foundation for International Community Assistance
(FINCA).80 FINCA, which started in 1985 with 200 borrowers in Costa
Rica, has disbursed over $136 million to more than 220,000 clients in
twenty countries in Africa, Asia, and North and South America by 2002.81
FINCA is structured much like the Grameen system, offering microloans to
groups of ten to fifty people, mostly women, in which all members assume
the personal responsibility of guaranteeing the loans of each of its
members, and reports a 97% repayment rate.82
76. See Rahman, supra note 62, at 5 (noting the high interest rates charged by local
moneylenders).
77. CULLEN-DU PONT, supra note 1, at 25.
78. USAID, MICROENTERPRISE RESULTS REPORTING, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
FISCAL
YEAR
2008
(2009),
available
at
http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=40534_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC.
79. See e.g., Press Release, USAID, USAID Program In Iraq Tops $150 Million in
Microloans
(Mar.
25
2008),
available
at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2008/pr080325.html (announcing the disbursement of
microloans to small groups of people in Iraq and noting the high repayment rate).
80. See FINCA‟s History, FOUND. FOR INT‟L COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE (FINCA),
http://www.villagebanking.org/site/c.erKPI2PCIoE/b.2604291/k.99B5/FINCAs_History.ht
m (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (describing why FINCA was created and how it has evolved
over time).
81. Id.
82. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
FINCA,
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The success of microcredit

The Microcredit Summit Campaign, a global coalition of
microlenders, estimates that as of 2006, over 3,100 MFIs were providing
financial services to more than 113 million people worldwide.83 Over
eighty-one million of these clients lived on less than $1 a day when they
took their first loan.84 Of these poorest clients, 84% were women.85
Women have been successful in paying back microloans, with most MFIs
achieving loan repayment rates upwards of 95%.86
Studies also demonstrate that microcredit programs have increased
poor women‟s economic opportunities.87 Some argue that microcredit has
empowered women by “putting capital in their hands and allowing them to
earn an independent income and contribute financially to their households
and communities.”88 In addition, borrowers‟ children, particularly female
children, have “higher rates of enrollment in school, and borrowers tend to
be more attentive to the medical needs of their children.”89
Microcredit has been lauded as a tool for eradicating poverty.90 In
2000, the U.S. passed legislation implementing microcredit programs to
prevent and deter trafficking in women.91 The United Nations declared
2005 to be the “International Year of Microcredit,” in an effort to help poor
countries reach economic sustainability through microcredit.92 In 2006, Dr.
Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, won the Nobel
Peace Prize.93 This recognition has “helped microfinance emerge at the
forefront of a number of international campaigns designed to alleviate

http://www.finca.org/site/c.6fIGIXMFJnJ0H/b.6088223/k.802B/Frequently_Asked_Questio
ns.htm#vbank (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (discussing microcredit generally and specifically
how the Village Banking system that FINCA has created functions).
83. SAM DALEY-HARRIS, MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN 18 (2006).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. About Microfinance, DIGNITY FUND, http://www.dignityfund.com/about_mf.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
87. See generally UNICEF, supra note 61, at 3 (“[Microcredit] is a way of improving
the earning capacity and therefore the standard of living of the poor.”).
88. SUSY CHESTON & LISA KUHN, UNIFEM, EMPOWERING WOMEN THROUGH
MICROFINANCE 14, available at www.microcreditsummit.org/papers/empowerment.pdf.
89. See Avery, supra note 69, at 209 (citing UNICEF, supra note 61, at 6).
90. Khan, supra note 58, at 148.
91. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 §106, 22 U.S.C. § 7104
(2006). “The President shall establish and carry out international initiatives to enhance
economic opportunity for potential victims of trafficking as a method to deter trafficking.
Such initiatives may include (1) microcredit lending programs, training in business
development, skills training, and job counseling. . . .” Id.
92. Khan, supra note 58, at 148.
93. Id.
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poverty.” 94 However, as will be discussed in the next Section, there is an
ongoing debate as to whether microcredit reaches the poorest of the poor
and whether it is a “genuinely effective tool for poverty reduction.”95
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF MICROCREDIT IN DECREASING THE RATES OF
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN
In spite of the impressive statistics on the number of women who have
received microloans and the high rate of loan repayment, the literature
suggests that microcredit has a limited impact on poverty alleviation.96
Furthermore, the rates of human trafficking remain exceedingly high.97
Therefore, the shortcomings of microcredit must be identified and reforms
made to the system in order for it to serve as an effective economic means
of deterring trafficking in women.
This Section will highlight the current limitations of microcredit.
First, microloans fail to reach the poorest women who are at the highest
risk of entering into a trafficking situation.98 Second, the rigid microloan
structure requires immediate repayment at high interest rates,99 not only
perpetuating the cycle of poverty, but also increasing the likelihood that
women will seek seemingly legitimate economic opportunities outside of
their respective home countries to make loan repayments. Finally, there are
cultural and gender issues that must be addressed for microcredit to be
successful in decreasing trafficking, specifically the fact that many women
lose control of how the loan is used to male members of the household but
still retain liability for repayment.100 Women borrowers have also
experienced verbal and physical abuse for their involvement with
microloans.101

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 147.
97. Elizabeth M. Wheaton et al., Economics of Human Trafficking, INT‟L MIGRATION,
Aug. 2010, at 114, 114 (“Within the next 10 years, crime experts expect human trafficking
to surpass drug and arms trafficking in its incidence, cost to human wellbeing, and
profitability to criminals.”).
98. Celia Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 303, 327 (2002).
99. Avery, supra note 69, at 229.
100. Anne Marie Goetz & Rina Sen Gupta, Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power and
Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEV. 45, 49
(1996).
101. Rahman, supra note 62, at 158.
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Microloans do not reach the poorest women most vulnerable to
trafficking

According to the 2008 Microfinance India State of the Sector Report
(MISS), poverty audits reveal that, “in five out of eight [MFIs], the
proportion of non-poor clients‟ [(income more than $1 per day)] was more
than poor [clients‟ (income less than $1 per day)], with coverage of nonpoor ranging from 42 to 88[%] of the clientele.”102 In fact, MFIs seem to
be excluding the poorest segment and focusing mostly on the non-poor
group.103 This is likely due to the fact that many MFIs rely on external
donors for funds and are pressured to produce instantaneous results.104
Additionally, MFIs fail to reach the poorest segment of the population
because the rural poor are often dispersed geographically, making it
difficult to form groups.105 This group often requires smaller deposits and
loans, in a “context where poor physical infrastructure and increased
lending risk due to poorly diversified livelihoods and economics impose
higher costs on providers.”106 These factors make poor, rural women less
ideal candidates for microloans than their slightly wealthier counterparts.107
Furthermore, many MFIs select clients based on existing cash flows.
The cash flow combined with the joint liability of the group-lending model,
“acts as soft collateral against unwilling default.”108 As a result, in India,
requiring an existing cash flow excludes 36% of Indians who live on less
than $1 a day.109 This statistic indicates that the extremely poor women
who have the highest risk of becoming victims of trafficking are not being
served by microcredit.
Some scholars argue that it is simply impossible to provide
microcredit to the poorest of the poor, because it would not be financially
sustainable for the MFIs.110 MFIs need to maintain a balance between
outreach and sustainability, that is, the “balance between its social mission
102. Gautam Aggarwal & Saikat Podder, Microfinance: Treading a Fine Line Between
Financial and Social Objectives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126093830654793317.html.
103. Id.
104. Taylor, supra note 98, at 328.
105. Id. at 329.
106. Susan Johnson & Namrata Sharma, „Institutionalizing Suspicion‟: The Management
and Governance Challenge in User-Owned Microfinance Groups, in WHAT‟S WRONG WITH
MICROFINANCE?, 61, 63 (Thomas Dichter & Malcolm Harper eds., 2007).
107. Id. at 61, 63.
108. Aggarwal & Podder, supra note 102.
109. Id.
110. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 159 (“In considering the sustainability of the poverty
alleviation impact of the GB microfinance program[s] . . . it can safely be said that in terms
of consumption smoothing its performance is good but in terms of significant poverty
alleviation, the performance is not encouraging.”).
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of poverty alleviation and its commercial strategy of sustainability.”111
There has been an increase in the number of profit-oriented financial
institutions invested in MFIs, including Citigroup, Barclays and JP
Morgan.112 Commentators assert that this has “further led to dilution of
social objectives of MFIs, transforming them primarily into commercial
enterprises.”113 Fixating on financial sustainability has pushed MFIs to
focus on “easy-to-serve” and “relatively better-off populations”114 rather
than the rural poor, who are the most in need of financial assistance and
also the most susceptible to trafficking. Carlos Labarthe, one of the CEOs
of Compartamos, a Mexican microfinance institution that generates a profit
of $80 million a year by serving one million women with microcredit at
90% interest rates, summed up the current view of many MFIs in his
statement that microcredit is, “in a way creating wealth, more than wiping
out of poverty. Not bringing up the destitute.”115
This concentration on financial rather than social returns116 is
troubling, and suggests that many MFIs will not reach out to the poorest
segments of society and offer them flexible financial services because it is
not profitable. While it may be impossible for MFIs to reach all poor
women, in order for microcredit to be effective in curtailing the rates of
trafficking, the focus needs to be on maximizing outreach to the abject poor
rather than succeeding as a traditional financial institution.117
B.

Pressure to make immediate loan repayments at high interest rates
perpetuates poverty and can increase rates of trafficking

Women who are successful in obtaining a microloan must then
grapple with the tremendous pressure of making loan payments,
particularly under the group-lending structure where another group
member‟s future credit hinges on the success of the member currently

111. Id.
112. ANANYA ROY, POVERTY CAPITAL: MICROFINANCE AND THE MAKING OF
DEVELOPMENT 31 (2010).
113. Aggarwal & Podder, supra note 102.
114. Johnson & Sharma, supra note 106, at 70.
115. ROY, supra note 112, at 27 (citing Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, THE NEW
YORKER,
Oct.
30
2006,
at
62,
available
at
www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030fa_fact1).
116. ROY, supra note 112, at 26.
117. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 162-63 (“In considering the trade-off between poverty
alleviation and sustainability, it is emphasized that as the GB is the product of some
desperate economic situations . . . it is more of a poverty alleviation organization than just a
traditional commercial financial institution. The main objective of poverty alleviation is the
end, to which the GB should try to reach with its means of a sustainable financial structure .
. . .”).
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borrowing.118 The fact that many MFIs require immediate loan repayment
at interest rates upwards of 20%119 increases the pressure that these women
face. As a result, many borrow money from local moneylenders or seek
additional economic prospects to ensure that they can make timely
payments.120 Scholars argue that microcredit programs that are based on
group lending, “„promote[] unprecedented levels of indebtedness [and] that
the low default figures mask unprecedented misery.‟”121 The rigid
microloan structure places women further in debt and increases their
susceptibility to trafficking.
For most microenterprises, it takes about three months for income to
be earned from the microloan.122 However, the weekly loan-repayment
requirement forces borrowers to invest in projects that are expected to
generate immediate income.123 For example, a borrower is forced to spend
more money on a dairy cow, which can produce milk from the first week,
rather than a calf, which is a cheaper and better long-term investment but
will not yield immediate results.124
Scholars have also found that many women who receive microloans
initially use the loan for household consumption, including food and
medicine, instead of an activity that will generate immediate profit.125 One
study reported that 78% of microloans approved for specific projects were
actually used for other economic activities or to meet household needs.126
This results in women having to borrow from local moneylenders in order
to meet the initial repayments. Another study found that 57% of weekly
repayments were paid from sources other than investment profits, usually
from loans from moneylenders or family members.127 Relying on local
lenders that charge exorbitant interest rates places women further in debt128

118. Rahman, supra note 62, at 10.
119. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 152.
120. Jude Fernando, Nongovernmental Organizations, Micro-credit, and Empowerment
of Women, 554 ANNALS 150, 171 (1997).
121. Taylor, supra note 98, at 329 (quoting Lawrence Solomon, Micro-Credit's Dark
Underside; Problems of Bangladesh‟s Grameen Bank, WORLD PRESS REV., Aug. 1998, at
33).
122. See Avery, supra note 69, at 229 (articulating the limitations of the weekly loan
repayment system for microloans).
123. Taylor, supra note 98, at 329.
124. See Fernando, supra note 120, at 172 (1997) (discussing the limitations of
microcredit, including the loan repayments that put pressure on women to make weekly
repayments, often when they start their business and there is not much capital).
125. S.M. Rahman, A Practitioner‟s View of the Challenges Facing NGO-Based
Microfinance in Bangladesh, in WHAT‟S WRONG WITH MICROFINANCE?, 193, 195 (Thomas
Dichter and Malcolm Harper eds., 2007).
126. Rahman, supra note 62, at 182.
127. Id. at 183.
128. Id. at 5.
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and makes them more vulnerable to trafficking.129
There are a plethora of personal accounts of female microloan clients
discussing the burden to make the weekly loan repayments. One client
stated that women are expected to work day and night for the “privilege of
receiving small sums of credit,” and that the anxiety to repay under those
conditions “drove women back to the more lucrative, albeit exploitative,
sex industry.”130 Women consider the lack of flexibility in terms of loan
repayment to be a heavy burden. One woman who received a microloan
explained that:
We are constantly under pressure to think of ways in which we
can raise money for weekly repayment requirements. Often we
have to sell the few home-grown vegetables that we earlier used
for our own consumption, forgo buying books for our children
and medical treatment. Even if we try to give priority to these
needs, our group members will make sure that we sell whatever
we have in order to make the weekly repayment. . . .131
The pressure to make immediate loan repayments is a serious
limitation of microcredit that pushes many women to search for alternative
sources of cash.132 Borrowers, especially in the group-lending situation,
feel compelled to sell their own food and neglect their own family‟s needs
so that they do not fall behind on paying back the microloan. These
women are desperate for an opportunity to receive instant access to cash,
making them easy targets for traffickers.
C.

Cultural and gender limitations of microcredit

Microloans are distributed in developing countries where gender and
cultural norms discourage women from actively participating in the
economic sector. As a result, some women who receive microloans lose
control of the loan to male members of their household.133 In one study,
conducted by Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta, it was found that a
substantial portion of microloans given to women were directly invested by
male relatives, while the women retained the liability for repayment.134 In

129. Id.
130. Avery, supra note 69, at 231.
131. Fernando, supra note 120, at 174.
132. See Avery, supra note 69, at 229 (“Consequently, fledging microenterprise projects
often require women to borrow additional funds from unscrupulous moneylenders and
traders to pay off outstanding loans.”).
133. See generally Goetz & Gupta, supra note 100, at 49 (discussing the amount of
control women have over the microloans).
134. See id. at 49 (suggesting that in most cases where microloans are given to women
they do not retain control over how the loan is used but remain liable for loan repayments).
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approximately 63% of the cases studied, the female recipients of the loans
had partial, very limited, or no control over how the loan was used.135 This
lack of control over how the loan is invested is problematic for women
borrowers. If a particular loan is squandered and yields no profit, the
woman is still liable for the loan payments. As a result, the woman is left
to internalize the high cost of loaning to men136 and is forced to pursue
outside economic opportunities to ensure that the loan is repaid.
Research also indicates that women have experienced increased
domestic violence and physical aggression from males in the household
after receiving a microloan.137 In one study it was found that female
borrowers commonly experienced domestic abuse as a result of their
involvement with microloans.138 Among 120 women borrowers, 21 women
(18% of the sample) found that there was a decrease in aggression and
assault because of their involvement with the Grameen bank, 69 women
(57%) saw a rise in verbal aggression, and 16 women (13%) saw a rise in
both verbal and physical violence since they received their first loans.139
Six borrowers encountered violence when they refused to give their loan to
the male member of the household.140
MFIs need to address these cultural and gender barriers in the
communities where they disperse microloans. The notion of women
controlling loans subverts the traditional patriarchal hegemony of the
household and, without support systems in place, women may lose control
of the loan to the males of the house or be met with verbal and physical
violence.141 The combination of poverty and abuse encourages women to
seek refuge elsewhere, making them prime targets for traffickers.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are substantial limitations to the microcredit system that can
have the perverse effect of increasing poverty among women and instances
of trafficking. This Section will discuss recommendations of how to
correct the shortcomings of microcredit in order to create a system that
reaches the poorest women, reduces the pressure to make loan repayments,
135. Id.
136. MICHELLE BELLESSA, THE EFFECTS OF MICROLENDING ON WOMEN‟S EMPOWERMENT
IN
BANGLADESH
16,
available
at
http://marriottschool.byu.edu/emp/WPW/pdf/thirdworld/Small_Part_2.pdf.
137. Robin Isserles, Microcredit: The Rhetoric of Empowerment, the Reality of
“Development As Usual”, 31 WOMEN‟S STUD. Q. 38, 49 (2003).
138. See Rahman, supra note 62, at 158 (arguing in part that violence against women is
linked with the receipt of microloans).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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gives women more control over the loan, focuses on savings and education
rather than just credit, is more sensitive to gender and cultural limitations,
and collaborates with the state to maximize poverty reduction, eliminate
corruption among government officials, and decrease instances of
trafficking in women.
A.

MFIs need to reach the poorest women

In order to reach the poorest women who are the most vulnerable to
trafficking, MFIs need to rigorously target the poorest areas and further
target the poorest clients within these local areas.142 One group that has
made strides in providing access to credit is the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC), which targets the poorest of the poor,
mainly female-headed, landless households.143 To receive membership into
BRAC‟s Specially Targeted Ultra Poor (STUP) group at least three of the
following criteria must be met: (1) The household is dependent upon
female domestic work or begging; (2) Ownership of less than 10 decimals,
or one-tenth of an acre of land; (3) No active adult male members in the
household; (4) Children of school–going age have to take paid work; and
(5) No productive assets in the household. BRAC provides food aid,
employment, healthcare, skills training, compulsory savings, and ultimately
microfinance.144 This program is subsidized and does not recuperate its
financial costs.145 The lack of pressure to repay external donors, which
encourages most other MFIs to ignore the poorest of the poor, is one
explanation for BRAC‟s success.146 MFIs should implement a system
similar to BRAC‟s STUP program and strive to provide financial assistance
to the poorest women.
MFIs should also be more flexible to allow for smaller loans to be
taken out. For the extremely poor who fear that they will not be able to
meet the repayment requirements of a larger loan, a smaller loan would

142. Anton Simanowitz, Ensuring Impact: Reaching the Poorest While Building
Financially Self-Sufficient Institutions, and Showing Improvement in the Lives of the
Poorest Women and their Families, THE MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, 42 (Aug. 16,
2002), http://www.microcreditsummit.org/papers/ensuringimpact.pdf.
143. ROY, supra note 112, at 114; see also Economic Development: Targeting Extreme
Poverty,
BANGL.
RURAL
ADVANCEMENT
COMMITTEE
(BRAC),
http://www.brac.net/content/economic-development-targeting-extreme-poverty (last visited
Oct. 12, 2010) (describing the BRAC programs devoted to reducing poverty in Bangladesh).
144. Targeting
Extreme
Poverty:
Poverty
Targeting,
BRAC,
http://www.brac.net/content/targeting-extreme-poverty-poverty-targeting (last visited Oct
12, 2010).
145. ROY, supra note 112, at 114.
146. Id.
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provide them with less risk.147 There should be no floor to the loan amount
in order to maximize the number of poor clients that can be reached by
microcredit.148
Furthermore, in order to assist those most in need of microcredit, the
MFIs should try to lower the interest rates on the loans. Although the
interest rates offered by MFIs are lower than those offered by local
moneylenders, most still exceed 20%.149 Some strategies for decreasing
interest rates include “reducing transaction costs, push[ing] for high
growth, high repayments and portfolio turnover.”150 Lowering interest rates
would encourage those that are extremely poor, and thus averse to
obtaining loans with high interest rates, to take out microloans. This would
result in more customers for MFIs, potentially offsetting the cost of
decreasing the interest rates for the microloan. Even if decreased interest
rates make MFIs less profitable, it would help them achieve a more
important societal goal: alleviating poverty and diminishing the rates of
trafficking in women.
B.

MFIs need to be more flexible with loan repayments

A weekly loan repayment is unrealistic for many borrowers, especially
when first starting a business where capital has not yet been generated.151
Biweekly or monthly repayment options would put much less pressure on
women to have to borrow from local lenders, or to seek other economic
prospects in order to ensure timely repayment.
MFIs should also be attuned to environmental conditions that may
affect loan repayment.152 For example, in Mali it is very difficult to make
loan repayments during the rainy season.153 Requiring loan repayment
during these months has led to a high rate of attrition from microcredit
programs.154 MFIs must be sensitive to these environmental issues, which
vary from country to country, so that borrowers are not left to make loan

147. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 162.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 152 (using the Grameen Bank as a case study and pointing out that
effective rates of interest on loans issued by the bank exceed 20%).
150. Id. at 166.
151. Avery, supra note 69, at 229.
152. See ANASTASE NTEZIYAREMYE & BARBARA MKNELLY, FREEDOM FROM HUNGER,
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 7: MALI POVERTY OUTREACH STUDY OF THE KAFO JIGINEW AND
NYESIGISO CREDIT AND SAVINGS WITH EDUCATION PROGRAMS 62 (2001), available at
http://www.ffhtechnical.org/resources/research-reports/mali-poverty-outreach-study-kafojiginew-and-ny-sigiso-credit-and-savings (arguing for flexibility in repayment plans during
the rainy season).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 63.
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repayments during a period of time where profits are almost impossible to
yield.
The Grameen Bank has implemented a more flexible lending option
called “flexi-loan detour,” a way of “exiting the loan highway” and
returning several months later when repayment difficulties arise.155
Unfortunately, this “flexible” system is rife with disincentives for
borrowers to actually use this “detour,” particularly given the fact that once
a borrower exits the “loan highway” the loan ceiling that she built up over
the past years is wiped out.156 Despite these limitations, it is a positive sign
that lenders are becoming aware that more flexibility is needed in order for
microcredit to serve the poorest women.
C.

MFIs should create saving systems, not just give credit

Most MFIs have focused their efforts solely on extending credit to the
poor. However, this “credit-alone approach” is not helpful for alleviating
poverty, especially among the extremely poor.157 Commentators have
described savings as the “forgotten half” of the MFIs‟ involvement in
extending microloans in developing countries.158 Scholars suggest that
savings systems may result in the inclusion of the poorest 10-15% of the
population, who are risk averse159 and thus less likely to “experiment with
new ideas or invest money in businesses that involve taking risks.”160
In contrast to the rigid repayment requirements of microloans and the
fact that borrowers must pay interest on loans, savings systems offer
flexibility and the potential for earning interest.161 Research indicates that
poor clients are often able to save significant capital, and that they “value
safe and convenient savings facilities.”162 This access to savings can help
the poor “smooth consumption over periods of cyclical or unexpected
crisis, thus greatly improving their economic security.”163 Providing poor
women with a safety net to assist them during difficult economic times will
decrease their susceptibility to trafficking because they will not be in dire
need to have immediate access to capital.
155. ROY, supra note 112, at 110.
156. Id. at 118.
157. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 153.
158. Paul B. McGuire & John D. Conroy, The Microfinance Phenomenon, 7 ASIA-PAC.
REV. 90, 97 (2000).
159. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 154.
160. Khan, supra note 58, at 151.
161. REBECCA M. VONDERLACK & MARK SCHREINER, CTR. FOR SOC. DEV., WOMEN,
MICROFINANCE, AND SAVINGS: LESSONS AND PROPOSALS 3 (2001), available at
http://www.microfinance.com/English/Papers/Women_Microfinance_and_Savings.pdf.
162. McGuire & Conroy, supra note 158, at 97.
163. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 153.
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There are both informal and formal types of savings systems that can
be implemented in areas where microloans are distributed. Informal
savings systems include annual savings clubs, which are organized by
religious groups and social clubs, and allow members to make deposits of
any amount at each club meeting.164 These clubs do not give interest on the
savings but do provide a means for members to easily save money.165
Another type of informal saving system is a Rotating Savings and Credit
Association (ROSCA), which is a “group of individuals who come together
and make regular cyclical contributions to a common fund, which is then
given as a lump sum to one member.”166 This cycle continues until each
member has received a lump sum of the savings from the fund.167 The
advantage of ROSCA is that it “facilitates the availability of a lump sum of
money, which allows for higher investment to be made earlier than
accumulation of savings.”168 These types of informal savings are beneficial
because they allow individuals to build up savings at low transaction
costs.169 However, there is the potential for abuse in both informal savings
models. For example, in the savings club there is the risk that the funds
will be embezzled, wiping out all of the savings that members have accrued
over time.170 In a ROSCA, it is possible that an individual who has already
received a lump sum from the fund will no longer want to make
contributions to the pool.171 Furthermore, these savings systems do not
provide the interest that formal services provide.172
Formal savings programs can include banks offering savings accounts
with a positive rate of interest, no minimum deposit or balance, and
immediate access to withdrawals.173 There are also MFIs, including
SafeSave, that offer flexible savings programs to their clients.174 SafeSave
hires door-to-door collectors to visit clients daily, and clients can either
make a deposit or request to make a withdrawal.175 This program provides
the stability of a formal savings institution and allows members to earn
interest on their savings.176 There are also banks in Ghana and Mexico that

164. VONDERLACK & SCHREINER, supra note 161, at 7.
165. Id. at 9.
166. The Mutuality of Credit: Rotating Savings and Credit Association, THE GLOBAL
DEV. RESEARCH CTR., http://www.gdrc.org/icm/suppliers/rosca.html.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. VONDERLACK & SCHREINER, supra note 161, at 7.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 9.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 11-12.
174. Id. at 11.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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have formalized the ROSCA system, making members of the group sign
contracts that offer financial incentives for regular, fixed deposits.177 In
comparison to the informal ROSCA model, this formal ROSCA system
pays interest and provides more stability by requiring all group members to
sign a contract that binds them to fulfill specific duties and obligations.178
D.

MFIs need to educate women and help them develop business skills

Empirical studies indicate that microcredit loans coupled with training
programs have a higher probability of success, particularly with women.179
For example, in interviews with women who received loans from Sinapi
Aba Trust, most recipients commented that their ability to plan, project
profit, and manage money had improved substantially as a result of the
training they received from their orientation and Trust Bank meetings.180
Asociación para el Desarrollo Microempresarial Colombiano
(ADEMCOL) is another example of an MFI that offers, “holistic client
transformation by combining efficient delivery of financial services with
social interventions such as training, leadership development, and
development of business and social networks.”181 ADEMCOL has had
positive results, finding that training has not only led to more profitable
businesses, but has also empowered women.182 This empowerment is seen
in the comments of Gladis Lenis de Gonzales, a shoemaker and
ADEMCOL client, who remarked: “After having received the training, I
have had changes in both my business and my personal life. Intellectually,
I feel that my life has been reactivated, because studying, calculating, and
analyzing again have made me feel useful. . . .”183 Therefore, integrating
business training with microloan distribution could be beneficial for
optimizing business profits, while empowering women at the same time.
In addition to basic business training, women‟s education and literacy
are important. MFIs have cited illiteracy as “a major stumbling block for
their clients.”184
Although MFIs have largely steered away from
implementing literacy programs because they require a significant output of
177. Id. at 12.
178. Id.
179. ISLAM, supra note 10, at 161.
180. Cheston & Kuhn, supra note 88, at 39.
181. ASOCIACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO MICROEMPRESARIAL COLOMBIANO (ADEMCOL)
& WOMEN‟S OPPORTUNITY FUND, BUNDLING MICROFINANCE AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
SERVICES (BDS): A CASE STUDY FROM ADEMCOL IN COLOMBIA 7 (2001), available at
http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=7294_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC.
182. See id. (discussing ADEMCOL‟s innovative approach to a holistic method which
has led to the implementation of a number of empowering community programs).
183. Id. at vii.
184. Cheston & Kuhn, supra note 88, at 41.
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time and resources, there are some inexpensive ways that MFIs can
implement literacy training, including providing materials to women in the
lending groups to train themselves.185 The Women‟s Empowerment Project
(WEP) has used this low-cost method of training women and found that the
literacy rate of its members rose from 21% to 85% during the first thirty
months of the program.186
Increased education among women would expand the possible
microenterprises available for them to explore. With low levels of skill and
knowledge, women often have to create businesses that have low growth
potential.187 Assisting women design more complicated and high growth
potential businesses will help reduce poverty long-term and give them
financial stability so that they will not feel pressured to seek economic
prospects abroad and expose themselves to a potential trafficking
situation.188
E.

MFIs need to be attuned to cultural and gender issues

It is also important that MFIs support women who are balancing
responsibilities at home with maintaining their businesses. For example,
MFIs can hold forums in the lending centers where women can discuss
issues such as balancing family life with operating a business. These
forums have great potential because these economically empowered
women can begin to take steps to address the cultural and legal barriers that
limit their social and political power.189 The few MFIs that have started to
implement these forums have found that “women have greater knowledge
of their civil and legal rights and are more aware of their position and the
choices they can make.”190
MFIs are also beginning to implement outreach efforts to include
husbands in the microloan process. If the husband feels included, he may
be more likely to provide the necessary support for his wife so that she can
fulfill her multiple roles.191 Empirical data demonstrates that the “most
successful clients of many MFIs are the ones who have the most supportive
husbands and that those with more problems often have problems with their

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. (reporting that illiteracy is a major problem for recipients of micro loans).
188. See ISLAM, supra note 10, at 157 (noting that without high growth project support
the chances of reducing poverty long-term are “remote”).
189. Cheston & Kuhn, supra note 88, at 43.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 42 (pointing out that the most successful recipients of micro loans have
supportive husbands while those who struggle the most have, not coincidently, problems
with their spouses).
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husbands.”192 By including the husband in the microloan process, he may
be more supportive of his wife‟s involvement with microcredit.
Finally, there must be more surveillance over how the loan is utilized
to make sure that women are maintaining control over the microloan.
Certain safeguards could be put in place, including requiring borrowers to
provide detailed accounts of loan use.193 At the very least, MFIs should
require a contract between the woman and the actual user of the loan194 to
protect her from being held liable for failure to make loan repayments.
F.

MFIs should work with local governments to maximize poverty
reduction and deter trafficking

Scholars have found that there is a significant divide between MFIs
and the local governments of the countries where the loans are dispersed.195
As discussed earlier, these local governments have played an important role
in perpetuating trafficking because they reap economic profits from
traffickers.196 Therefore, it is crucial that MFIs try to collaborate with local
governments to eliminate the corruption, and to work in tandem to meet the
goals of alleviating poverty and deterring trafficking. It is unclear how
much collaboration is actually feasible between the local government and
the MFIs. The fact that MFIs are “outsiders” suggests that they may be
viewed as an intrusion rather than an asset to the local community and may
disrupt traditional social (especially gender) relations.197 Furthermore, the
economic profits that local governments receive from trafficking may
outweigh the benefits that result from partnerships with MFIs. However,
collaboration between local governments and MFIs can have a synergistic
effect in alleviating poverty and trafficking in women that is worth
pursuing in spite of the costs.
For MFIs, working with local governments would help create a more
particularized credit program that would be especially sensitive to the
cultural, political, religious, and economic issues specific to that country.198
Furthermore, collaboration could increase women‟s empowerment in the

192. Id.
193. Goetz & Gupta, supra note 100, at 60.
194. Id.
195. See Fernando, supra note 120, at 160 (discussing the divide between NGOs and
local governments).
196. See Bales, supra note 56, at 330 (noting that, by relegating it to a position of
political invisibility, governments may tacitly encourage trafficking because of its positive
effects on the local economy).
197. Taylor, supra note 98, at 334.
198. See id. at 335 (highlighting the benefits of collaboration between local governments
and NGOs).
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community. Many of these countries are hierarchical and patriarchal.199
Microcredit programs that focus on extending credit to women could direct
the country‟s attention to the need to provide assistance to this group200 and
show that women are successful at creating businesses and making loan
repayments. This could enhance the overall status of women in these
countries.201
MFIs could also work with local governments in a joint effort to
eliminate corruption among government officials who enable trafficking in
the community. Increasing surveillance of government officials to ensure
that they are not participating in trafficking is necessary. Collaborating
with the government to increase penalties for officials who assist traffickers
would also act as a deterrent.
Local governments would also benefit from collaboration with MFIs.
One goal of local governments is to provide social welfare and reduce
poverty.202 These communities are often poor and have limited economic
resources to help supplement their poor populations. However, by teaming
up with MFIs that have financial backing and access to cash, they can
maximize poverty reduction by ensuring that capital is being inserted into
the poorest areas of the country.203
VI. CONCLUSION
Microcredit could be instrumental in decreasing the rate of trafficking
in women. If microcredit can succeed in helping women rise out of
poverty, they are less likely to seek economic opportunities abroad and thus
less likely to become victims of trafficking. However, microcredit, in its
current form, actually perpetuates the cycle of poverty and increases
women‟s vulnerability to trafficking.
A significant overhaul of the microcredit system is necessary in order
for it to effectively combat the global human trafficking epidemic.
Unfortunately, many MFIs receive their funds from private donors and face
external pressure to ensure that the loans are repaid on time and that the
MFI is profitable. For microcredit to be successful in diminishing the rates
of trafficking in women, MFIs need to pair flexible microloans with nonfinancial services for women, including educational opportunities and
assistance in overcoming cultural and gender barriers. Furthermore, the
MFIs need to maintain an ethos of poverty-focused development rather
than wealth production in order for microcredit to successfully alleviate
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Rahman, supra note 62, at 28.
Taylor, supra note 98, at 336.
Id. at 335-36.
Taylor, supra note 98, at 334.
Id. at 335.
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